Abstract This paper proposes a secure encrypted-data aggregation scheme for wireless sensor networks. Our design for data aggregation eliminates redundant sensor readings without using encryption and maintains data secrecy and privacy during transmission. Conventional aggregation functions operate when readings are received in plaintext. If readings are encrypted, aggregation requires decryption creating extra overhead and key management issues. In contrast to conventional schemes, our proposed scheme provides security and privacy, and duplicate instances of original readings will be aggregated into a single packet. Our scheme is resilient to known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks, ciphertext-only attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Our experiments show that our proposed aggregation method significantly reduces communication overhead and can be practically implemented in on-the-shelf sensor platforms.
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) have emerged as an important new area in wireless technology. A wireless sensor network [1] is a distributed system interacting with physical environment. It consists of motes equipped with task-specific sensors to measure the surrounding environment, e.g., temperature, movement, etc. It provides solutions to many challenging problems such as wildlife, battlefield, wildfire, or building safety monitoring. A key component in a WSN is the sensor mote, which contains (a) a simple microprocessor, (b) application-specific sensors, and (c) a wireless transceiver. Each sensor mote is typically powered by batteries, making energy consumption an issue.
A major application for a wireless mote is to measure environmental values using embedded sensors, and transmit sensed data to a remote repository or a remote server. Because of limited transmission capabilities, this often requires multi-hop forwarding of messages, and is power consuming.
One specific power-saving mechanism used in wireless sensor networks is data aggregation [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Our paper proposes a novel method for eliminating duplicate encrypted data during aggregation without decryption. Data aggregation [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] has been put forward as an essential paradigm in sensor networks. The aggregator uses specific functions, such as addition, subtraction or exclusiveor, to aggregate incoming readings, and only aggregated result are forwarded [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] . Therefore, communication overhead can be reduced by decreasing the number of transmitted packets [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] . Without encryption, adversaries can monitor and inject false data into the network. Encryption can solve this problem, but how can we aggregate over encrypted data [31] ?
Adversaries can use the following attacks:
• Adversaries can deploy sensors near existing sensors to determine their likely value.
• Adversaries can use common key encryption systems (which always encrypt common sensor data in the same way) to see when two readings are identical. By using nearby sensors under the adversaries' control, adversaries can conduct a known-plaintext attack.
• Adversaries can tamper with sensors to force them to predetermined values (such as heating a temperature sensor) and thus conduct a chosen-plaintext attack.
• Adversaries can inject false readings or resend logged readings from legitimate sensor motes to manipulate the data aggregation process, conducting a man-in-themiddle attack. Table 1 presents encryption policies, possible attacks, and vulnerabilities in data aggregation schemes. This paper proposes a new method for determining and eliminating duplicate data while protecting privacy (using encryption) without excessive key-management or power management issues. Our scheme has the following contributions. First, we provide a lightweight data aggregation mechanism which protects data when data are processed in aggregators. Aggregators can help to eliminate redundant data without decrypting data. Thus, aggregators do not need to spend extra power in data decryption, and more network lifetime can be guaranteed. Second, our proposed scheme is resilient to known-plaintext attacks, chosenplaintext attacks, ciphertext-only attacks, and man-in-themiddle attacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 provides background on related work. In Sect. 3, we describe our system architecture and proposed aggregation protocol.Security analysis and performance evaluation are given in Sects. 5 and 6 offers conclusions and future directions.
Related work
Previous work in data aggregation assumes that every mote is honest and only transmits their correct readings. Intanagonwiwat, Govindan, Estrin, and Heidemann [17] proposed a data-centric diffusion method to aggregate data. Their method enables diffusion to achieve energy savings by selecting empirically good paths and by caching and processing data in-network. Though their method can achieve significant energy savings, security is not put into consideration in their design.
Hu and Evans [13] further examined the problem that a single compromised sensor mote can render the networks useless, or worse, mislead the operator into trusting a false reading. They proposed an aggregation protocol that is resilient to both intruder devices and single device key compromises, but their scheme suffers a problem that the aggregated data will be expanded every time when it was aggregated and forwarded by any intermediate sensor mote.
Przydatek et al. [30] proposed a secure information aggregation protocol to answer queries over the data acquired by the sensors. In particular, their proposed protocols are designed especially for secure computation of the median and the average of the measurements, for the estimation of the network size and for finding the minimum and maximum sensor reading. Even though their scheme provided data authentication to provide secrecy, the data is still delivered in plaintext format which provides no privacy during transmission. Wagner [14] presented a paper studying related attacks on data aggregation in sensor networks. He thoroughly examined current aggregation functions and proved that these aggregation functions are vulnerable and insecure under several attacks. He also proposed a theoretical framework for evaluating data aggregation resiliently in sensor networks and in its security against these attacks. Still privacy is not guaranteed in his scheme.
Acharya and Girao [2] proposed an end-to-end encryption algorithm supporting operations over ciphertexts for wireless sensor networks. Their scheme uses a special class of encryption functions, Privacy Homomorphisms (PH) [32] [33] [34] [35] 16] , that allow end-to-end encryption and provide aggregation functions that are applied to ciphertexts. PH is an encryption transformation that allows direct computations on encrypted data. Two functions E and D are additively homomorphic encryption and decryption if the following property is satisfied: for plaintext operands x and y and key
However, privacy homomorphisms have exponential bound in computation. It is too computationally expensive to implement in wireless sensor networks. Moreover, it has been proved that privacy homomorphism is insecure even against ciphertext only attacks which are commonly encountered in wireless sensor networks.
Cam et al. [6] proposed a secure energy-efficient data aggregation (ESPDA) to prevent redundant data transmission in data aggregation. Unlike conventional techniques, their scheme prevents the redundant transmission from sensor motes to the aggregator. Before transmitting sensed data, each sensor transmits a secure pattern to the aggregator. The secure pattern is generated by associating original data with a random number. Instead of transmitting ''real'' data, the sensor mote transmits the secure patter to the cluster-head before transmitting it. The cluster-head then uses these secure patterns to check which sensors have same readings. Then, the cluster-head notifies certain sensor motes to transmit their data. Only sensors with different data are allowed to transmit their data to the cluster-head. However, since each sensor at least needs to transmit a packet containing a pattern once, power cannot be significantly saved. In addition, each sensor mote uses a fixed encryption key to encrypt data; data privacy cannot be maintained in their scheme.
Perrig and Tygar [36] proposed several secure broadcast schemes suitable for wireless sensor networks. The computation overhead for their schemes is affordable for tiny sensor motes. They proposed a hashed key-chain scheme to sequentially generate encryption/decryption keys for sensor motes without notifying others. Przydatek, Song and Perrig [30] further extended these schemes and proposed a secure data aggregation scheme for sensor network. Their scheme provided an efficient random sampling mechanisms and interactive proofs to enable the querier to verify that the answer given by the aggregator is a good approximation of the true value, even when the aggregator and some sensor motes were compromised.
3 Problem statement and proposed data aggregation Data aggregation uses primitive functions, such as mean, average, addition, subtraction, and exclusive or to eliminate identical readings, and only unique results are be forwarded, reducing the cost of data transmission. Figure 1 depicts an overview of data aggregation flow.
3.1 Proposed data aggregation method
Architecture
There are two commonly used network topologies in sensor networks. One is the self-organized sensor network (Fig. 2) . A self-organized network is a multi-hop, temporary autonomous system composed of sensor motes with wireless transmission capability. It is easy to form such networks but every mote in such networks consumes significant amounts of power in data transmission as each node must spend power to transmit/forward data to other sensor nodes because of the dynamic network topology. The other network topology is the clustered sensor network (Fig. 3) . In this architecture, the entire network is partitioned into non-overlapping clusters. Each cluster has an aggregator (or cluster head) to receive readings from other sensor motes and to forward these readings to the remote server. To extend operation lifetime, we choose the clustered topology as our network architecture [29] . In a clustered sensor network, each mote temporarily belongs to a cluster, and sensors in this cluster will receive and forward data for sensors in the same cluster. Since a mote only transmits data for several motes instead of all motes, it can obviously reduce its power consumption for data transmission.
In a clustered WSN, we assume the network is divided into clusters. Each cluster owns an aggregator having a more powerful wireless transceiver that can transmit data directly to the backend server. In our framework, we also assume each sensor transmits data only to the aggregator; hence, each sensor mote can reduce overhead in forwarding data packets. We also assume sensor motes have no mobility, i.e., they are fixed in a position and will not be moved forever. The question of how to best deploy sensor motes and how to cluster these sensor motes is interesting to consider but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Using a clustered network to reduce power consumption, we propose a data aggregation method which maintains both secrecy and privacy. In terms of secrecy, each sensor mote encrypts its reading and transmits the encrypted data to the aggregator (Fig. 4 ). Adversaries will not be able to recognize what reading it is during data transmission. In terms of privacy, our design aims to eliminate redundant reading for data aggregation but this reading remains secret to the aggregator, i.e., the aggregator cannot know anything about these readings. Besides, our design can also prevent known-plaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks and ciphertext-only attacks.
System setup
Before deploying a wireless sensor network, we have to set up three roles: the sensor mote, the aggregator, and the remote database. 
Wireless Netw 1. The sensor mote: each sensor mote i is assigned an one-way function g, and a verification key K i VK . 2. The aggregator: the aggregator is given the one-way function g, and all
Vi. Hereafter, these keys are referred as aggregation verification keys. 3. The remote database: The remote database needs to decrypt aggregated data, and thus we need to store the one-way hash function f, the one-way function g, and all verification key K VK i for all i.
Necessary keys, identities, and functions are pre-distributed in the sensor mote, the aggregator, and the remote database before they are physically deployed and used. Table 2 lists all pre-installed elements in individual roles.
Key pre-distribution is a scheme where keys are distributed among all sensor motes prior to deployment. Our proposed key pre-distribution scheme does not rely on prior deployment knowledge. Sensor motes are installed with random keys for encryption. These encryption keys have no mandatory relations between each other, and this makes system setup more flexible.
Random keys can be generated by using random source of data, such as values based on CPU clock, radioactive decay, or atmospheric noise. The question of how to generating random numbers is interesting to consider but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Proposed scheme
There are two phases in our proposed scheme: data encryption phase and data aggregation phase. The encryption phase provides a lightweight encryption algorithm that supports data aggregation property, and provides secrecy and privacy for data transmission. The data aggregation phase provides a method to eliminate redundant readings from sensor motes without decrypting them. Since the aggregator cannot decrypt incoming packets, the aggregator cannot know anything about the plaintext, and therefore more power can be saved.
Data encryption phase Our encryption design aims to provide lightweight encryption overhead and secrecy while providing data aggregation property.
When a sensor mote i has a reading m i and wishes to transmit this reading to the aggregator, it first randomly generates a new key K EK i ; which will be used as the nextround encryption key. By using g, K EK i ; and K VK i ; the corresponding ciphertext E i (m i ) is defined in Eq. 1.
where k indicates data concatenation. Our proposed scheme is very close to the one-time pad method [37] as each mote changes to a different key for encrypting data but provides more capabilities. It is obvious that the length of data is required to be at least as long as the length of encryption key in our proposed scheme. When the length of data is shorter than the length of the key, extra padding must be appended to the data so that the appended data can be encrypted. As the message m i is xored with g K
; it does not matter if we pad random values or fixed values (e.g., all 0's or 1's). It does not reduce any security strength in our scheme.
Next, we will introduce how to find out redundant readings among these ciphertexts without decrypting them in our data aggregation phase.
Data aggregation phase Our data aggregation method provides a pair-wise method to identify if two readings are identical. Although the goal of our data aggregation scheme is to find redundant readings among n incoming encrypted packets in the aggregator, our aggregation scheme can be further extended by pairing off these n incoming encrypted packets. By iteratively performing pair-wise comparisons we can eliminate all redundant readings among them. If n same readings are encrypted and transmitted to the aggregator, the aggregator needs to check n -1 times to verify these inputs and save n -1 packet transmission. It needs computation overhead for data aggregation but saves more energy from fewer data transmissions.
In the following section, first we will introduce our approach to find redundant readings in two packets; then, we will introduce how to extend our approach to find redundant readings among n packets.
Assume sensor mote i and j sends two encrypted readings to the aggregator, and these encrypted readings can be expressed by the following equations:
First, the aggregator XOR the first parts of these two ciphertexts, and it can be expressed by the following equation:
Next, since the aggregator is pre-installed with
; the aggregator can XOR the last two parts of Eqs. 2 and 3 to obtain: 
It can be found that the aggregator can use E i (m i ) and
EK separately; therefore, the aggregator cannot decrypt E i (m i ) and E j (m j ).
Next, we define a check value V, and V is calculated by XOR Eqs. 4 and 5 and g K
The check value is used to distinguish if two encrypted readings are the redundant in their plaintext format. As a result, the check value V can be expressed by the following equation:
By using the properties of function g, Eq. 6 can be further reduced to: 
In above case, the aggregator only needs to examine two incoming ciphertexts, but in general cases, the aggregator usually receives more than two incoming ciphertexts. When the aggregator receive n (n [ 2) incoming ciphertexts E 1 ; E 2 ; . . .; E n ð Þ ; our proposed scheme can be easily extended. First, we group these ciphertexts into pairs, i.e., E i ; E j À Á 8i: Then, we can repeat above steps to generate their check value V. Next, we can use V to check if E i has the same reading with E j . Finally, if V ð1;2Þ ¼ V ð2;3Þ ¼ Á Á Á ¼ V ðnÀ1;nÞ ; then we can conclude that E 1 ; E 2 ; . . .; E n has the same reading. Figure 6 depicts necessary comparisons for data aggregation when n = 5. It can be observed that
Step 1:
Step 2: Wireless Netw these comparisons can be viewed as all edges in a complete graph, and we will discuss this property in next section.
Preliminaries: When the aggregator receives n encrypted readings, the minimum number of comparisons is n -1 under the condition that all these readings (when unencrypted) are the same. The maximum number of comparisons is nðnÀ1Þ 2 when all these readings (when unencrypted) are totally different from each other.
Threat models
The goals of the adversaries are to read, insert, and even modify sensor readings. We consider several possible threats, classified according to the capabilities of the adversaries.
Known-plaintext attacks
To implement known-plaintext attacks, no capabilities are need except the ability to deploy malicious sensors close to legitimate sensors. In this scenario, an adversary can
• Collect all readings from all sensors, calculated aggregated values, know their routing paths, and inject wrong readings or aggregated values to the network.
• Collect abundant encrypted readings to enhance the compromise of encryption keys.
In practice, known-plaintext attacks can be easily achieved by deploying same sensor very close to legitimate sensors. The goal of these attacks is merely to read readings and to record corresponding responses of a sensor mote.
Chosen-plaintext attacks
• Adjust the sensors by changing physical conditions, such as temperature or moisture.
• Log all plaintext-ciphertext mappings without knowing what the encryption keys are.
In practice, adversaries can take some physical methods to adjust the sensing environment in order to make sensor motes generate false readings the adversaries desired. For example, adversaries can use heaters to raise the temperature to a certain degree, and temperature sensors will send the false temperature readings making the aggregators generate incorrect results.
Man-in-the-middle attacks
• Read, insert, or modify messages between sensor motes.
• Inject false readings or resend logged readings on behalf of legitimate sensor motes to malfunction data aggregation.
Significantly, we assume that an adversary cannot retrieve encryption keys from a sensor mote by physically compromising it. Otherwise, there will be no security at all.
Security analysis and performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our proposed scheme according to two aspects: theoretical and practical. In theoretical aspect, we use random oracle model to justify our protocol is secure in terms of provable security. We firstly built an ideal random oracle model and show that our proposed encryption algorithm is an implementation of the ideal random oracle. Then, we use the random oracle model to justify that it can resist know-ciphertext attacks. In practical aspect, we estimate necessary time for compromising our proposed scheme using different key lengths. The result shows that using encryption keys longer than 80 bits would be considerable secure enough even if the adversary uses 1,000,000 4 GHz PCs running simultaneously to compromise our scheme. Then, we show that our proposed scheme can resist known-plaintext attacks, chose-plaintext attacks, and know-ciphertext attacks. Before we proceed to theoretical proof, we first describe the security requirement specifying the adversary's abilities and when the latter is considered successful. The abilities and disabilities of the adversary include:
• The adversary has an arbitrary polynomial-time computation power.
• The adversary can eavesdrop on messages in the air.
• The adversary can know the original readings of any sensor.
• The adversary cannot access the encryption keys.
An attack is considered to be successful if the adversary can compromise the encryption keys. In terms of system security, we adopt the idea in [38] . A system is considered secure if any adversary with the given abilities has only a negligible probability of success.
A random oracle is a theoretical black box that replies to queries with random response chosen uniformly in its output domain. A methodology for designing a cryptographic protocol can be divided into two steps. In first step, one designs an ideal system in which all participants as well as adversaries have oracle access to a truly random function, and proves the security of the ideal system. In second step, we replace the random oracle by a ''good cryptographic hashing function''. We can therefore obtain an implementation of the ideal system in a real-word where random oracles do not exist. This methodology is referred to as the random oracle methodology.
Before we build our ideal system, we first describe the notion. 
Preliminaries
Definition A function e(k) is negligible if for every c there exists a k c satisfying e(k) B k -c for every k C k -c .
Definition If A P is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any inputs m 1 , m 2 ,…, A P (m 1 , m 2 ,…) is the probability space which to the sting r assigns the probability that A P outputs r. For probabilistic spaces S, T,…, P r [x / S; y / T;…:p(x, y,…)] denotes the probability that the predicate p(x, y,…) is true after the execution of the algorithms x / S, y / T, etc.
Definition A random oracle R is a map from {0, 1}* to {0, 1}
? chosen by selecting each bit of R(x) uniformly for every x.
Without lost of generosity, our proposed scheme can be formulated as the following oracle:
Known-plaintext security
For known-plaintext attacks, the adversary knows some m, and P r The attacker successfully guesses G r 1 ð Þ ½ can be described as:
j j % 0; when r 1 is large enough. We suggest that |r 1 | C 88 is adequate and mathematical induction will be given later.
Chosen-plaintext security
We adapt the notion of CP-adversary (chosen-plaintext adversary) in [39] to the random oracle model. A CPadversary A is a pair of non-uniform polynomial algorithms (F, A 1 ), each with access to an oracle. For an encryption algorithm # to be secure, it requires that 
Proof The proof is by contradiction. Let A = (F, A 1 ) be an adversary that defeats our protocol. Often, the adversary gains advantage k(k) for some inverse polynomial k. We construct an algorithm M(f, d, y) that, when ðf ;f À1 ;dÞ #ð1 k Þ;r dð1 k Þ;y f ðrÞ; manages to compute f -1 (y). It simulates the oracle G and samples (m 0 , m 1 ) / F G (E). If G is asked an r such that f(r) = y, then Moutputs r and halts; otherwise, the F(E) terminates and M chooses a yjjs for s f0;1g jm 0 j : Then M simulates A G 1 ðE;m 0 ;m 1 ;aÞ; watching the oracle queries that A 1 makes to see if there is any oracle query r for which f(r) = y. Let A k be the event that A 1 does not ask for the image of G at r. It satisfies that 1=2 þ kðkÞ ¼ P r ½A succeeds jA K Á P r ½A k þ P r ½A succeeds jA k Á P r ½A k : Thus, Eq. 10 is satisfied.
Chosen-ciphertext security
The chosen-ciphertext attack is defined as: the adversary can adaptively choose ciphertexts and access to the decryption algorithm to get the corresponding plaintexts. Though it is usually occurred in asymmetric cryptographic systems, it can also be happened in our scheme as the adversary can know both ciphertexts and plaintexts (by using same sensors) in the same time. We adapt the definition of [39, 40] to the random oracle [38] setting. An RSadversary (''Rackoff-Simon adversary'') A is a pair of nonuniform algorithms A = (F, A 1 ), each with access to an oracle R and a black box implementation of D R . The algorithm F is used to generate two messages m 0 and m 1 such that if A 1 is given the encryption a, A 1 won't be able to guess well whether a comes m 0 or m 1 . Formally, an encryption scheme # is secure against RS-attack if the following equation is satisfied:
Proof To see our scheme is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, we prove the above equation is satisfied. Let A k denotes the event that akb FðEÞ; for some a and b. Let A = (F, A 1 ) be an RS-adversary that succeeds with probability 1 2 þ kðkÞ for some non-negligible function k(k). The adversary A can make some oracle call of G(r 1 ) or HðGðr 1 ÞÞ: Let L k denotes the event that A 1 asked D G;H some queries where a ¼ m È f À1 ðr 1 Þ È Hðf À1 ðr 1 ÞÞ; but A 1 never asked its H-oracle for Hðf À1 ðr 1 ÞÞ. Let n(k) denotes the total number of oracle queries made. It is easy to see that Pr½L k nðkÞ2
Àk and Pr½A succeeds L K \ A K ¼ 0:5 according to [39] .
Thus
Therefore, our proposed scheme satisfies Eq. 11, and is chosen-ciphertext-attack resistant.
In practice aspect, we evaluate the difficulties to brute force our proposed scheme. To brute force our proposed scheme, first the adversary need to spend time generating all possible keys and test the result with every possible key. We assume that the adversary can generate an encryption key and test the result in one duty cycle, our proposed scheme uses r-bit keys to encrypt data, and the adversary uses a g G-Hz PC to brute force our propose scheme. To completely test all possibilities by exhaustive search, the adversary would need to spend 2 r ðcyclesÞ g Ã 10; 000; 000 Ã 86400 Ã 365 years to compromise our scheme. Assume the adversary uses a 4G-Hz PC to brute force our scheme which uses a 64-bit encryption key, the adversary needs to generate all 2 64 keys and uses these keys to test the result. If we assume that the adversary can test our encryption scheme within one duty cycle, the total computation time to test all 2 64 keys is: 2 64 =4G=86400=365 % 14; 624 years:
However, the adversary can use more PCs simultaneously to compromise our algorithm. If the adversary uses 1,000,000 PCs running simultaneously to compromise our scheme, the total computation time to test all conditions is 2 64 =4G=86400=365=1M % 0:01 years:
In this case, it takes about 3-4 days to compromise our scheme which is unacceptably insecure. Table 3 lists estimated time to brute force our proposed scheme with different key lengths. To maintain acceptable security while using minimal key length, we suggest use 80-bit keys to encrypt data as the adversaries need about 958 years to compromise our scheme even if they use 1,000,000 PCs to attack our scheme in parallel. Moreover, using longer encryption keys can dramatically increase difficulties to compromise our scheme as it exponentially expend the key space which makes adversaries spend more time to brute force the proposed scheme. Figure 7 illustrate the growth rate of key size (2 r ) and the growth rate (g) of PCs. Assume the adversary know sensor reading m and corresponding ciphertext
; the adversary can therefore know gðK in advance, the adversary cannot compromiseK EK i : Furthermore, since the encryption keys will be arbitrarily changed, our scheme can hence resist known-plaintext attacks. Even adversary can generate designate data m to confuse sensor motes, still the adversary cannot learn anything about the encryption keys. Therefore, our scheme can resist know-ciphertext attacks and chosen-ciphertext attacks.
One workload we have to pay is the number of comparisons it takes to verify encrypted-data from n motes. Our proposed scheme can reduce the number of comparisons as it has transitive property. The transitive property is described as: Given E h (m h ), E i (m i ), and E j (m j ), if V (h,i) = 0 and V (i,j) = 0, then V (h,j) = 0. This is pretty simple to prove. If V (h,i) = 0 and V (i,j) = 0, then m h = m i and m i = m j It can therefore be easily seen that m h = m i = m j .
With this transitive property, if all readings are the same, the minimum number comparisons for verifying data from n sensor motes is n -1. And, according to Fig. 6 , the maximum number comparisons for verifying data from n Fig. 7 The growth rate of key size (2 r ) and the growth rate (g) of PCs
Wireless Netw sensor motes is equal to the number of edges in a n-complete graph which is nðnÀ1Þ 2
: It is shown in Fig. 8 that our computation bound is limited between O(n) and O(n 2 ), and this can be affordable for off-the-shelf sensor platforms.
In comparison with other schemes, our encryption algorithm uses XOR and a hash function. Our encryption algorithm is more lightweight. Our proposed encryption algorithm changes its encryption key whenever there's a reading that needs to be transmitted. This makes our scheme more feasible for wireless sensor networks. Table 4 lists the differences between our scheme and other schemes.
Key Compromise One major issue in our scheme is the key compromise problem. As the aggregator stored K is been compromised, all other encryption key K j VK 8j 6 ¼ i will be compromised. Therefore, the aggregator must have stronger security protection than sensor motes. One way to enhance the hardware security strength in the aggregator is to install a TPM (Trust Platform Module) chip inside the sensor mote, and all paired encryption keys
Vi are stored inside TPM. It can significantly reduce the possibility that adversaries compromise the aggregators.
Data Size Variation Here we discuss the storage requirement when the length of data is increased. When the length of data is increased, the encryption key must be increased correspondingly. Assume the length of data is increased by l 0 , the length of key as well will increase l 0 bits. As each sensor mote stores K i VK only, it requires more l 0 bits to store the encryption key. For the aggregator, as the aggregator stores all paired encryption keys
Vi, it requires more h Á l 0 bits where h is the number of sensor motes in the cluster. It can be seen that when the length of data is increased linearly, the storage requirement for storing keys is also increased linearly.
Efficiency Here we discuss the efficiency caused from our proposed scheme. Our proposed saves power by eliminating redundant packets. Thus, the more packets are eliminated, the more power can be saved. As we mentioned earlier, the minimum number of comparisons is n-1 under the condition that all these readings (when unencrypted) are the same, amd the maximum number of comparisons is nðnÀ1Þ 2 . For the best case, it reduces (n-1) packet transmissions. For the worst case, it does not reduce any packet transmission overhead. For average case, assume that there totally n packets and m of them are the same, the number of comparisons is ðm À 1Þ þ ðn À mÞðn À m À 1Þ=2: It reduces n -m packets in average case. Table 5 lists the efficiency comparisons for the best, average, and the worst cases.
Conclusion and future directions
In this paper, we proposed a secure encrypted-data aggregation scheme for wireless sensor networks. Our scheme has the following enhancements: (1) the aggregator does n(n-1)/2 n-1 Fig. 8 The number of comparisons for verifying n encrypted-data 
Wireless Netw not need to decrypt its received encrypted-data to verify if these data are the same; no extra power are wasted in data decryption, (2) the aggregator does not have decryption keys and therefore cannot know anything about the data, and (3) our proposed scheme uses random keys to encrypt data; this property makes our scheme resilient to knownplaintext attacks, chosen-plaintext attacks, ciphertext-only attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Moreover, compared with conventional PH-based data aggregation schemes, received data can be recovered and decrypted to be further analyzed. Our proposed scheme provides secrecy and privacy in the sense that each sensor mote randomly generates a new encryption key each time providing semantic security for data encryption phase proposed data aggregation, and the intermediate aggregators cannot decrypt these encrypted-data. Aiming at secrecy and privacy, our proposed scheme is resilient to several attacks in sensor networks, and makes data aggregation more practical in these environments. Our proposed scheme extends one-time pad to provide a secure encrypted-data aggregation paradigm for wireless sensor. Though it supports secrecy and privacy, our scheme provides only equality check. More general mathematical operations, such as addition, subtraction, and so on, should be further investigated under the same condition: the encryption keys are always changing and the aggregator cannot decrypt data through it. Except these mathematical operands, operands for strings, such as finding substring, should also be provided.
Currently, our scheme is workable in a one-level clustered network environment, i.e., the aggregator can onehop to the base station. However, in real deployment, it is usually not the case. Our future work toward this problem is to extend our scheme to multi-level cluster environment. Another problem in our scheme is that our experimental sensor motes must be fixed to a cluster and can no longer be moved to another cluster. We will also address this issue in our future work.
For key management, our proposed scheme pre-installs keys for verification and data aggregation in the aggregator before deployment. This limits the flexibility of system deployment and aggregation. In future work, we expect to modify our key management method so that these keys will not be stored in aggregators in advance but will be exchanged and retrieved when necessary. We also look forward to extending privacy homomorphism functions to support dynamic key management to bring more flexibility in data aggregation.
Our protocol uses only XOR operations and an irreversible hash function to encrypt data. The security strength is not as strong as block cipher encryption algorithms, such as AES, DES, etc. We also expect to extend our scheme to adopt block-cipher encryption algorithms to provide higher security strength for aggregation.
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